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Abstract We present an experiment designed to test the Modigliani-Miller theorem.
Applying a general equilibrium approach and not allowing for arbitrage among firms
with different capital structures, we find that, in accordance with the theorem, par-
ticipants well recognize changes in the systematic risk of equity associated with in-
creasing leverage and, accordingly, demand higher rate of return. Yet, this adjust-
ment is not perfect: subjects underestimate the systematic risk of low-leveraged eq-
uity whereas they overestimate the systematic risk of high-leveraged equity, resulting
in a U-shaped cost of capital. A (control) individual decision-making experiment,
eliciting several points on individual demand and supply curves for shares, provides
some support for the theorem.
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1 Introduction
Modigliani and Miller (1958) demonstrate that in a perfect capital market1 the value
of a firm is independent of how that firm is financed. Since its appearance this the-
orem (now known as the Modigliani-Miller or MM theorem) has been an object of
lively debates and extensive empirical analyses. The original article itself includes a
section devoted to testing the propositions on oil and electricity utility industries. The
results show that there is little evidence of a relationship between leverage and the
cost of capital. In a follow-up study, Miller and Modigliani (1966) adopt a two-stage
instrumental variable procedure to estimate the cost of capital for a sample of large
US electric utilities for the years 1954, 1956, and 1957. They find no evidence for
“sizable leverage or dividend effects of the kind assumed in much of the traditional
literature of finance”.
The opposition to the MM theorem comes from many angles. Weston (1963)
tests the theorem using the same sample of electricity utility industries as used by
Modigliani and Miller (1958), but for the year 1959 rather than for the years 1947 and
1948. His multiple regression analysis indicates that leverage does have an influence
on a firm’s cost of capital when earnings growth is taken into account. Robichek et
al. (1967) extend the analysis of Miller and Modigliani (1966) to the years 1955 and
1958–1964. They conclude that MM’s results are a consequence of circumstances
prevailing at the time of their study. Davenport (1971) uses data on three industry
groups (chemicals, food, and metal manufacturing), and his results are indicative of
a U-shaped cost of capital with respect to leverage. Other empirical studies suggest-
ing that a firm’s value changes significantly in response to changes in the capital
structure include Masulis (1980), Dann (1981), Masulis and Korwar (1986), Pinegar
and Lease (1986), Graham and Harvey (2001), and Arzac and Glosten (2005). These
studies and, generally, most of the works rejecting the propositions of the MM theo-
rem rely on some kind of market imperfections. However, no study so far has tried to
focus on the more fundamental question: could the empirical violations of the MM
theorem be inherent in the valuation process?
A clean and conclusive test of the above fundamental question using real market
data is virtually impossible. Not only the restrictions and assumptions that the theo-
rem demands may not be fulfilled in the real world, but also the ceteris paribus con-
ditions, necessary to explore the impact of the debt-equity ratio on the firm’s value in
isolation, are often violated. Hence, an apparent significant correlation between lever-
age and cost of capital may be accounted for by the presence of imperfections such
as taxes or transactions costs. By the same token, the seemingly independence of the
1That is, a market where there are no taxes, transactions costs, or asymmetric information, and investors
and firms are price takers.
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capital structure from the leverage ratio may be due to a relationship between lever-
age and other factors influencing the cost of capital, e.g., earnings growth may offset
the effect of leverage on the cost of capital (see, e.g., Weston 1963). Myers (2001,
p. 86) rightly admits that the MM theorem “is exceptionally difficult to test directly”.
Unambiguous experimental evidence of the theorem seems therefore much-needed
before we can be confident about the impact of the capital structure on the firm’s
value.
Motivated by these considerations, in this paper we test the MM theorem directly
in a competitive market experiment. Creating a laboratory environment as close as
possible to the theoretical model, we want to assess whether subjects’ valuations of
firms that generate the same income stream vary with the capital structure. The model
we use is adapted from that of Stiglitz (1969). Using a general equilibrium approach,
we prove rigorously that if individuals can borrow at the same market rate of interest
as firms and there is no bankruptcy, the MM theorem always holds in equilibrium, and
this result does not depend on individuals’ risk attitudes and initial wealth positions.
To test a key assumption of our model, we also run a (control) individual decision-
making experiment.
Our paper contributes to the literature in at least three ways. First, we pro-
vide empirical data to test the MM theorem. Although the theorem plays a central
role in corporate finance, its empirical investigation has been rather limited. Sec-
ond, we examine the MM theorem in a clean and robust environment. The robust-
ness and external validity of laboratory experimental results are often questioned
due to the usually used subject pool. Since our general equilibrium approach im-
poses mild assumptions on individual risk attitudes and initial wealth positions,
we believe that our results should hold in relatively broad conditions. Finally, we
test expected utility theory in a market mechanism. Numerous studies have shown
that individuals violate expected utility theory more often than otherwise. But, to
our knowledge, no study has examined the theory via market mechanisms. It has
been contended that markets, via arbitrage and learning, can perform better than
individuals. Our finding, that the MM theorem does not hold perfectly, suggests
that more work will have to be done before this contention can actually be em-
braced.
The paper proceeds as follows. Details about the MM theorem and our adaptation
of Stiglitz’s (1969) model are presented in Sect. 2, after discussing the U-shaped cost
of capital approach. The experimental design is laid out in Sect. 3. The results are
reported in Sect. 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Theories of the cost of capital
Before 1958 the cost of capital was thought to possess a U shape. The argument runs
as follows. Since equity is more risky (and thus more costly) than debt,2 a firm can
2A firm promises to make contractual payments whatever its earnings. Thus, when there is no bankruptcy,
debt has no risk. When there is a positive probability of bankruptcy, debt is still the less risky option
because it has priority over equity in payment.
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reduce its cost of capital by issuing debt in exchange for equity. As the debt-equity
ratio of the leveraged firm increases further, default risk becomes larger and, after
some point, debt becomes more expensive than equity.
To clarify the issue, consider a firm with market value of bonds B and market
value of equity or shares S, so that V ≡ B +S is the market value of the firm. Denote
by τ = B
V
the leverage ratio, by i the expected rate of return on equity, and by r the
rate of return on debts. The unit cost of capital, ρ, is simply the weighted average of
i and r :
ρ = S
V
i + B
V
r
= (1 − τ) · i + τ · r. (1)
Two conditions are required for (1) to be U-shaped. First, r must be a function
of τ ; more specifically, r < i when τ is small and r > i when τ exceeds a threshold.
Second, i must be independent of τ . As we will show below, the latter requirement
does not hold if investors are risk averse.
Consider the following simple framework, which borrows heavily from our ex-
perimental setup. In time 1 (before interest payment), a firm generates income X˜
which can be either 1200 or 800, with equal probabilities. The firm’s expected value
is therefore X¯ = 1000. Suppose first that the firm is entirely financed with equity, and
V = S = 600. Then the rate of return on equity can be 2 or 1.33, each with proba-
bility 0.5. Hence, the expected rate of return on equity (i) is 1.67. Suppose now that
the firm issues bonds (B ′) worth 100 at an interest rate (r) of 1.5. By assumption i
remains unchanged, implying that
1200 − 100 × 1.5
S′
0.5 + 800 − 100 × 1.5
S′
0.5 = 1.67, (2)
where S′ is the new value of equity. Solving (2) for S′ yields S′ ≈ 509, so that the
new market value of the firm is V ′ = B ′ + S′ ≈ 609. The rate of return on equity
is now 2.06 or 1.28, each with probability 0.5. Investors ask therefore for the same
rate of return for an income flow with higher risk. As suggested by standard financial
theory, this cannot happen if investors are risk averse.
The above example has already revealed the intuition of the MM theorem. Recog-
nizing the relationship between τ and i, Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) Proposition
I asserts that the market value of any firm is independent of its capital structure and
is given by capitalizing its expected return at some rate ρ appropriate to its risk
level.
2.1 The methodology
Several approaches may be taken to examine the MM theorem. In this paper, we
shall ask experimental subjects to evaluate the equity of firms with different capital
structures separately over different markets. In other words, we place each firm in a
separate market, thereby excluding arbitrage among the firms.
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Arbitrage plays an important role in Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) analysis
for it helps to restore the stated equalities if Proposition I is violated. However,
arbitrage is not necessary for the theorem to hold (see, e.g., Hirshleifer 1966;
Stiglitz 1969). Additionally, allowing for arbitrage among firms may conceal the ex-
istence of preferences for firms with a particular capital structure because a few arbi-
trageurs could help eliminate this ‘anomaly’ at the market level. After all, as shown
by Shleifer and Vishny (1997), arbitrage can never be complete in real financial mar-
kets. By excluding arbitrage among firms we can address a question of fundamental
importance to the valuation of firms: Do subjects systematically evaluate firms with
different capital structures differently? If so, how?
There is an additional strength in proceeding this way. Some empirical studies
show that firms with different capital structures are evaluated similarly. Yet, this does
not necessarily imply the irrelevance of capital structure to the value of the firm. The
same result could be obtained if investors, in general, preferred some capital structure
τ ∗ to some other capital structure τ ′, but these preferences were recognized by the
firms that adjusted their capital structure towards τ ∗. In this case, firms would be
evaluated similarly simply because their capital structure is concentrated on τ ∗. Our
approach allows us to explore this possibility.
Note, however, that the exclusion of arbitrage may cause a potential problem.
Since the law of one price cannot be applied,3 the investors’ personal traits (like risk
attitudes or wealth levels) become relevant and can affect results. For example, the
valuation of different risky shares may differ depending on the portfolio that investors
hold. Yet, this difference in valuations does not reflect the difference in shares per se,
but it relates to the composition of the investors’ portfolio. Since we want to focus
on the valuation process per se, we need to minimize the impact of the participants’
own traits. For this purpose, we adopt Stiglitz’s (1969) general equilibrium model. In
this model the MM theorem holds regardless of the participants’ initial wealth con-
ditions. Furthermore, the equilibrium solution is derived from the state-preference
approach (Hirshleifer 1966) which, compared to the more familiar mean-variance
approach, does not make strong assumptions about risk attitudes or utility function
shapes. Hence the results hold under more general conditions.
2.2 The model
Consider an economy with one firm and a set N of individual investors. The firm
operates for two periods: t0 (present) and t1 (future). The uncertain income stream X˜
generated by the firm at t1 is a function of the future state of the world θ . Let X˜(θ)
denote the firm’s income in state θ . Each investor j ∈ N is endowed with an initial
wealth ωj , which is composed of a fraction αj of S (the firm’s equity) and Bj units
of bonds. Since the economy is closed, we have
∑
j∈N
αj = 1,
∑
j∈N
Bj = B,
3The law of one price states that in an efficient market all identical goods must have only one price.
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where B stands, as before, for the market value of the firm’s bonds. By conven-
tion, one unit of bond costs one unit of money. Thus, investor j ’s budget constraint
(∀j ∈ N ) is
ωj = αjS + Bj . (3)
In addition, there exists a credit market where both the firm and the investors can
borrow and lend at the rate of interest r . To be consistent with the assumptions of
MM theorem, we suppose that the firm never goes bankrupt. Investors prefer more to
less, and evaluate alternative portfolios in terms of the income stream they generate,
i.e., investors’ preferences are not state dependent.
2.2.1 The benchmark solution
In this section we shall prove the following proposition:
Proposition 1
(1) If there exists a general equilibrium with a fully-equity financed firm having a
particular value, then there exists another general equilibrium solution for the
economy with the firm having any other capital structure but with its value un-
changed.
(2) Moreover, the property that the firm’s value is unchanged holds in any equilib-
rium.4
Let us now consider two economies. The firm in the first economy is only financed
by equity. The firm in the second economy is financed by both equity and bonds. Let
V1 and V2 denote the value of the firm in the first and second economy, respectively.
We first show that there exists a general equilibrium solution with V2 = V1.
Start from the first economy. Since the firm issues no bonds, we have V1 = S1
(with S1 being the value of the firm’s equity in this economy) and
∑
j∈N B
j
1 = 0. Here
a positive (negative) value of Bj1 would mean that investor j invests (borrows) Bj1
units of money in (from) the credit market. Let Y j1 (θ) stand for investor j ’s income
in state θ of economy 1. With a portfolio consisting of αj shares of the firm and Bj1
units of bonds, investor j ’s return in state θ can be written as:
Y
j
1 (θ) = αj X˜(θ) + rBj1
= αj X˜(θ) + r(ωj − αjV1
)
, (4)
which follows from (3) and S1 = V1.
Turn now to the second economy where the firm issues bonds with a market value
of B2. If S2 denotes the value of the firm’s equity in this economy, we have V2 =
S2 + B2 and ∑j∈N Bj2 = B2. Notice that the firm generates the same pattern of in-
come stream X˜. With a portfolio consisting of αj shares of the firm and Bj2 units of
4Stiglitz (1969) only proves the first part of the proposition. We complete the proof by demonstrating the
second part.
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bonds, investor j ’s return in state θ is then given by:
Y
j
2 (θ) = αj
(
X˜(θ) − rB2
) + rBj2
= αj (X˜(θ) − rB2
) + r(ωj − αjS2
)
= αj X˜(θ) + r(ωj − αjV2
)
, (5)
where the third equality follows from S2 = V2 − B2.
If V1 = V2 = V ∗, the opportunity sets described by (4) and (5) are identical, i.e.:
Y
j
1 (θ) = Y j2 (θ) ∀θ and ∀j. (6)
Thus, if αj maximizes individual j ’s utility in the first economy, it still does in the
second economy. This proves the first part of Proposition 1.5 It remains to show that
V1 = V2 = V ∗ holds in any equilibrium.
Suppose that in the second economy, in addition to the equilibrium in which
V1 = V2 = V ∗, another equilibrium where V ′2 > V1 = V ∗ exists. This in turn implies
S′2 = V ′2 − B2 > V ∗ − B2 = S∗2 . As the rate of return on equity is X˜−rBS , with X˜ and
B unchanged, the increase in the firm’s equity value (from S∗2 to S′2) yields a decrease
in the rate of return on equity. Such a decrease discourages the demand for equity in
the second economy. Note that, since V1 = V2 = V ∗ is supported in an equilibrium,
the equity market of the second economy must be able to clear at S∗2 = V ∗ − B2. It
follows that, when the firm’s equity value in the second economy increases from S∗2
to S′2, there will be oversupply of equity. But this is in contradiction with the assump-
tion that V ′2 > V ∗ is also an equilibrium. The case V ′2 < V ∗ can be proved similarly.
Two features of the above model are worth noticing. First, no assumptions are
made about investors’ initial wealth. This is particularly helpful when conducting
laboratory experiments because it reduces effects of sample selection on results. Sec-
ond, except for the basic assumption that investors prefer more to less, no strong
assumptions are made with respect to the shape of the utility function. Therefore,
we expect experimental results based upon the above model to hold in fairly broad
circumstances.
3 Experimental protocol
The computerized experiment was conducted in September 2007. Overall, we ran 3
sessions with a total of 78 participants, all being students at the Friedrich-Schiller
University of Jena (Germany). The first session (with 14 participants) was performed
in the video lab of the Max Planck Institute of Economics. In this session, two sub-
jects were put into one cubicle and acted as one agent.6 We explicitly asked the par-
ticipants to discuss loudly their strategy so that both their discussion and their game
play could be recorded. The other two sessions (with 32 participants each) were run
5Since the optimal income streams of the two economies are the same in all states of the world, there is no
need to have a specific utility function and to explicitly compute investors’ expected utility.
6As only 14 subjects showed up, in two cubicles we had only one student.
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in the computer lab of the Max Planck Institute of Economics. The experiment was
programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). Considering the complexity of the exper-
imental procedures, only students with relatively high analytical skills were invited,
i.e., students majoring in subjects such as mathematics, physics, engineering, eco-
nomics, and business administration.
Each experimental session had two subsequent phases. The first phase was used to
measure participants’ risk attitudes by means of Holt and Laury (2002) lottery task.
The second phase was devoted to testing the model outlined in Sect. 2.2.7 The instruc-
tions distributed at the beginning informed participants that the experiment consisted
of two phases, and explained the rules of the first phase only. Written instructions on
the second phase were distributed at the end of the first one (a translation of instruc-
tions is provided in the supplement). In both phases amounts were denominated in
ECU (Experimental Currency Units), where 10 ECU = 1 Euro. Participants earned
on average €15.90, inclusive of a €2.50 show-up fee.
3.1 Measuring risk attitudes
In the first phase, the lottery choice experiment developed by Holt and Laury (2002)
is used to estimate participants’ risk attitudes.8 Subjects are shown ten pairwise com-
parisons. In each comparison they are asked to choose between a safe option Y and
a risky option X (see the instructions in the supplement for a complete representa-
tion of the ten comparisons). The payoff for option Y is fixed at 50 ECU. The payoff
for option X can be either 70 ECU with probability p or 30 ECU with probability
(1 − p). In each successive comparison, p increases by 10 percentage points, until
finally the last decision involves no uncertainty. Subjects’ choices (in particular, the
comparison at which they switch from Y to X) reveal their risk preferences.9 At the
end of the phase, one of the ten comparisons is randomly selected to determine the
payoff based upon the chosen option. In order not to effect choices in the following
phase, feedback on individual earnings in the first phase is given only at the end of
the session (i.e., on completion of the second phase).
3.2 Testing the model
The second phase provides data to test the MM theorem. To this aim, we rely on the
model presented in Sect. 2.2. Participants are matched in groups of 8 (i.e., N = 8)
and asked to evaluate eight firms in eight successive treatments via a market mecha-
nism to be explained shortly. In the experiment, treatments are referred to as rounds.
Group composition does not change throughout the phase.10 Having one firm per
treatment renders valuations independent from each other. To further discourage (po-
7Although the model does not depend on participants’ risk attitudes, such attitudes can affect the firm’s
value in each single economy. Thus, assessing risk attitudes can provide valuable insights into the values
of the firms implied by the data.
8While there is currently no agreement about how to best assess risk preferences, the Holt and Laury
procedure offers several advantages, among which its easy applicability. Additionally, no systematic bias
has been found with respect to alternative methods of measuring risk (see Harrison and Rutström 2008).
9Consistent subjects should only switch once from Y to X, and never back from X to Y .
10We have, therefore, one group in the video lab session and four groups in each of the two computer lab
sessions, yielding a total of nine groups.
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tential) portfolio effects, only one treatment/round is randomly selected for payment
at the end of the experiment.
Denote a treatment by T and the firm in the T -th treatment by fT . Each fT is
represented by a risky asset that generates income X˜(θ) that can be 1200 ECU or 800
ECU depending on whether θ (i.e., the state of the world) is good or bad, respectively.
Since our experimental design is rather complex (especially, the implemented mar-
ket mechanism requires some cognitive effort), there is a need to minimize the impact
of nuisance variables like fatigue, boredom, alertness, and computational skills. For
this reason, we impose Prob(θ = good) = Prob(θ = bad) = 12 . Equally likely out-
comes are often encountered in practice and easy for subjects to understand. Addi-
tionally, some researchers argue that in the case of equally likely outcomes, probabil-
ities are less subjectively weighted, i.e., they are less distorted (e.g., Quiggin 1982;
Viscusi 1989), and—even if they are distorted—this distortion does not affect prefer-
ences (Levy and Levy 2002).
Each firm fT has 100 shares outstanding and a market value of bonds BT , so that
firms differ only in their value of BT . Since there is no bankruptcy, bonds are perfectly
safe: one unit of experimental money invested in bonds yields a gross return of 1.5,
implying a net risk-free interest rate of 0.5. The sequence of bonds’ values BT chosen
for characterizing the firms in the eight treatments is:
T : 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
BT : 50 ⇒ 350 ⇒ 100 ⇒ 0 ⇒ 400 ⇒ 200 ⇒ 500 ⇒ 300.
The first two treatments (T = 1,2) are for training purposes. Their sole aim is to
familiarize the participants with the decision process and its incentives (they cannot
be drawn for payment).
We preferred not to present subjects with the complete capital structure of each
firm (income flow and bonds’ market value). Instead, we give subjects the eight equi-
ties (that is, the resulting return structure after payment of the interest on the bonds:
X˜ − 1.5BT ) and ask them to evaluate each equity. Thus, the participants are con-
fronted with the following sequence of risky alternatives:
1
⎧
⎨
⎩
Gain Prob.
11.25 0.5
7.25 0.5
⇒ 2
⎧
⎨
⎩
Gain Prob.
6.75 0.5
2.75 0.5
⇒ 3
⎧
⎨
⎩
Gain Prob.
10.50 0.5
6.50 0.5
⇒ 4
⎧
⎨
⎩
Gain Prob.
12.00 0.5
8.00 0.5
⇒ 5
⎧
⎨
⎩
Gain Prob.
6.00 0.5
2.00 0.5
⇒ 6
⎧
⎨
⎩
Gain Prob.
9.00 0.5
5.00 0.5
⇒ 7
⎧
⎨
⎩
Gain Prob.
4.50 0.5
0.50 0.5
⇒ 8
⎧
⎨
⎩
Gain Prob.
7.50 0.5
3.50 0.5.
(7)
A first reason for presenting each firm’s equity as a 50/50 gamble is that some
students (especially the economists) may have learned the MM theorem. Knowledge
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of the complete capital structure may induce them to be consistent with the theorem,
thereby biasing the results. A second important reason is that such a presentation
is very simple and allows us to effectively focus on the impact of different capital
structures on the valuation of firms, minimizing any other confounding factor. If, in
contradiction to the MM theorem, firms with different capital structures are evaluated
differently, this pattern should emerge also when people are shown simple 50/50
gambles. To put it differently, if the theorem is violated in a complex environment, it
is unclear whether the violation is due to the complexity of the task or is genuine in
nature. On the other hand, if the MM theorem is not supported even in a simple setting
like ours, we can more safely presume that there is something inherently wrong with
the assumptions of the model.
It could be argued that given our presentation of the capital structure, compliance
with the MM theorem is to be expected.11 Yet, despite our efforts to simplify the task,
behaving in accordance with the theorem is not immediately straightforward. For ex-
ample, instead of combining equities and bonds (thus making portfolio choices as
suggested in the model) subjects could simplify the valuation process by ignoring
their bond endowments and focusing exclusively on the valuation of equities. Addi-
tionally, subjects might not recognize the increase of systematic risk in equity until
the leverage ratio reaches a certain threshold. In Davenport (1971), it is observed that
there are substantial cost advantages to be gained by increasing leverage up to a cer-
tain range, and that there is also strong evidence that beyond a certain point further
increases in the leverage ratio will lead to increases in the over-all cost of capital.
3.2.1 Specific procedures and trading mechanism
We now turn to a discussion of the specific procedures followed in the conduct of the
second experimental phase.
At the beginning of each treatment/round T (= 1, . . . ,8), four out of the eight
group members receive 12 units of T ’s risky alternative (i.e., 12 % of firm fT ’s 100
shares) and an amount of ECU equal to 12 % of BT ; the remaining four group mem-
bers receive 13 units of T ’s risky alternative and an amount of ECU equal to 13 %
of BT .12 Participants are informed that their experimental money is automatically de-
posited into a bank, paying a net risk-free interest rate of 0.5. Participants also know
that they can borrow any amount of ECU from the bank at the same interest rate. The
task of each subject is to trade the units of T ’s risky alternative at his disposal with
the other seven members of his group. Traded quantities are required to be integers,
11For instance, Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2010) show that when all liabilities are correctly priced, the
MM irrelevance result applies to banks’ organizational structure.
12The determination of the subjects’ initial endowments is important, especially when subjects’ payments
are based on the net profits they make, as it is here. Since the theoretical model suggests that agents’
endowments in the different treatments should be the same (cf., Eq. (3)), endowing the participants with
the same amount of ECU might seem a natural choice. However, in a general equilibrium framework,
endowing the participants with the same amount of ECU would require knowing the value of the firm
a priori, i.e., before the experiment.
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and short selling is not allowed. Buying and selling prices must be within the range
[(800 − 1.5 × BT )/(100 × 1.5), (1200 − 1.5 × BT )/100].13
Although the theoretical model is silent about the market trading mechanism, the
experimental choice of it is very important. Since we are interested in equilibrium
outcomes, the trading mechanism should allow for sufficient learning and conver-
gence. Moreover, it should be able to effectively aggregate private information (e.g.,
one’s own valuation of the alternatives), and to minimize the impact of individual
mistakes on market prices.
In security markets, the daily opening price of a stock is especially difficult to
determine because of the high uncertainty associated with the stock’s fundamental
value after the overnight non-trading period. To set a reliable opening price, most
major stock exchanges (e.g., New York, London, Frankfurt, Paris) use a call auction to
open markets. Economides and Schwartz (1995) show that, by gathering many orders
together, the call auction can facilitate order entry, reduce volatility, and enhance price
discovery. These features make the call auction a perfect candidate for our market
experiment.14
More specifically, in each treatment/round the participants have 3 minutes to sub-
mit buy or sell orders. They must specify (a) how many units of the risky alternative
they want to buy or sell, and (b) the price at which they wish to trade each unit. After
the 3 minutes, aggregate demand and supply schedules are derived from the individ-
ual orders. The market clearing (equilibrium) price is chosen to maximize volume
of trades. The algorithm used to compute the market clearing price is reproduced in
Appendix A.
To help subjects set a “reasonable” price and to increase learning, the 3 minutes
are divided into three trading periods, each lasting 1 minute.15 An “indicative” market
clearing price is computed and announced at the end of the first two trading periods.
This price is indicative in the sense that it suggests the price at which all eligible
trades would occur if no orders were changed. Subjects know that they can revise
their trade orders until the end of the allotted three minutes.
When the market closes, the net change in each agent’s endowment of the risky
alternative is considered. If the change is positive, for each purchased unit the agent
pays a per-unit price equal to the market-clearing price; this amount is automatically
deducted from the ECU he owns. If the change is negative, for each sold unit the
agent receives a per-unit price equal to the market-clearing price; the received amount
is automatically deposited in the bank, thereby earning a net risk-free interest rate
of 0.5. To provide subjects with strong marginal incentive and to increase the cost
of mistakes, we pay them only the net profits they make (the difference between the
value of their final bundle and the value of their initial bundle).
13Notice that the upper bound of the interval allows for non-rational behavior (as a further check on
subjects’ understanding of the situation).
14An alternative is the double-auction mechanism, which has quicker and more efficient convergence
properties (see, e.g., Smith et al. 1982; Cason and Friedman 1997, 2008; Kagel 2004), but is slower to
implement and quite time consuming.
15To allow for sufficient learning, in each of the two training treatments the call auction opens for 6 min-
utes, and each trading period lasts 2 minutes.
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At the end of each T , subjects are informed about (a) the market clearing price,
and (b) their own final holdings of ECU and risky alternative. To decrease income or
wealth effects, information about the realized state of the world in each T is given
only at the end of the experiment,16 together with one’s own net profit in each T , the
treatment randomly chosen for payment, and one’s own final payoff.
3.3 A (control) individual decision-making experiment
Testing the MM theorem via the above trading mechanism can provide helpful in-
sights into how the market evaluates firms with different capital structures. However,
for the model to hold, the markets must be always in equilibrium. As remarked above,
previous experimental studies have cast doubt on the ability of call markets to pro-
duce convergence to the competitive equilibrium quickly and efficiently (see Cason
and Friedman 1997, 2008, and references therein). Furthermore, even if the aggre-
gate market outcome provides support for the MM theorem, this does not necessarily
imply that every agent is making his utility-maximizing choice. Thus, following the
suggestion of an anonymous referee, as a check on the robustness of our results, we
ran a fourth session where 32 subjects participated in an individual decision-making
experiment.
The session was conducted in the experimental laboratory of the Max Planck In-
stitute. In accordance with the market experiment, only subjects with relatively high
analytical skill were invited. Before starting the experiment, subjects had to answer
three control questions. The session lasted about two hours including instructions and
control questionnaire. The average payment was €17.90.
This control experiment maintains several features of the market experiment. Sub-
jects play eight rounds, denoted once more by T . In each round T subjects are pre-
sented with one of the risky alternatives given in (7), thereby facing a firm with a
specific capital structure. Half of the subjects are endowed with 12 shares of firm fT
and 12 % × BT ECU; the other half of the subjects are endowed with 13 shares of
firm fT and 13 % × BT ECU.17 The experimental money is deposited into a bank,
which pays a net interest rate of 0.5 for each ECU deposited. Similarly, subjects need
to pay a net interest rate of 0.5 per borrowed ECU.
In each round (and thus for a given capital structure and endowment), four points
on each subject’s supply and demand curves for shares are elicited, corresponding to
quantities of 1, 5, 9, 12 or 13. Specifically, a subject who is endowed with 12 (13)
shares is asked to buy and sell 1, 5, 9, and 12 (13) units. In each round, the eight
choices are elicited in a random order so as to exclude ordering effects.
As elicitation procedure we use the incentive-compatible Becker–DeGroot–
Marschak mechanism (Becker et al. 1964). In the four ‘buy’ decisions, each subject is
asked to report the highest price WTP(x) (x = 1,5,9,12 or 13) at which he would be
willing to buy each of the x units, where WTP(x) ∈ [0.50,12]. In the four ‘sell’ de-
cision, each subject is asked to submit the minimum selling price WTA(x) per unit,
16We provide this information at the end of T = 1,2 (the two training treatments) to foster learning of the
incentives.
17Shares are referred to as units of the risky alternative in the instructions.
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where WTA(x) ∈ [0.50,12]. At the end of each round, one of the eight decisions
is randomly selected. A further draw from a uniform distribution determines a ran-
dom number π ∈ [0.50,12] and the selected decision (either buy or sell) is executed
depending on whether or not π exceeds the price specified by the subject.18
4 Experimental results
The results are presented in two subsections. First, we analyze the data gathered from
the market experiment, beginning with a presentation of the participants’ risk atti-
tudes. Then, as a robustness check, we detail the results of the individual decision-
making experiment.
4.1 Market experiment
Risk attitudes play an important role in markets. In fact, in the current framework,
heterogeneity of risk preferences is one of the main reasons for trading. In Holt and
Laury (2002) lottery choice procedure—that we employed in the first phase of the
market experiment—the subjects’ total number of safe choices can be used as a proxy
for risk aversion. Denote this proxy by γ . Obviously, the larger the value of γ , the
higher the degree of risk aversion. We find considerable variation across people and a
median γ -value of 6, which suggests that most participants are risk averse. For exam-
ple, for individuals who have Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) preferences
with coefficient α, a median γ -value of 6 corresponds to an α of 1.47. Furthermore,
all subjects are consistent, i.e., they have a single switch point.19
According to standard portfolio theory, relatively risk averse individuals should
hold a greater portion of their wealth in safe deposits, whereas more risk tolerant in-
dividuals should prefer higher-risk assets. In line with this assertion, we find that the
correlation between γ and subjects’ end-holdings of experimental money is signifi-
cantly positive (Spearman’s ρ = 0.09, p < 0.01), and the correlation between γ and
subjects’ end-holdings of the risky alternative is significantly negative (Spearman’s
ρ = −0.091, p < 0.05).
As noted above, given the complexity of our experiment, we invited only students
with relatively high analytical skills. Moreover, prior to the experiment, subjects had
to answer a control questionnaire testing their comprehension of the rules. We sus-
pect, however, that some subjects did not pick up all facets of the problem. First,
during the administration of the control questionnaire, a few people encountered dif-
ficulties in handling a gross interest rate of 1.5. Second, in the post-experimental
questionnaire, a number of subjects explicitly complained about the difficulty of the
task. It is then important to check that the experimental results are reliable. To this
aim we compare the values of the firms implied by the experimental data with the
theoretical values resulting from both the assumption of rational risk neutral agents
18If the payoff-relevant decision is a buy decision and WTP(x) ≥ π , the subject purchases the x units at a
unit price of π . If the payoff-relevant decision is a sell decision and WTA(x) ≤ π , the subject sells the x
units at a unit price of π .
19Such a consistency may be a consequence of the stringent selection criteria used for recruiting subjects.
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Fig. 1 Empirical values of the firms across periods
and the hypothesis that agents have CRRA utility function u(w) = w1−1.471−1.47 , where
α = 1.47 is estimated from the observed median γ -value of 6.20
Since the risk-free gross interest rate was 1.5, a risky asset paying either 1200 or
800 with equal probabilities should be valued at (1200 × 0.5 + 800 × 0.5)/1.5 = 667
by risk neutral rational agents. The valuation of firms by agents with CRRA utility
function can be shown to be 628.07.21 Figure 1 displays the development of the firms’
empirical values across periods. On the horizontal axis, three consecutive periods rep-
resent one treatment, i.e., periods 1–3 correspond to T = 1, periods 4–6 correspond
to T = 2, etc. The circles denote the firms’ indicative values, calculated from the in-
dicative market clearing prices determined at the end of the first two trading periods
of each treatment. The triangles denote the firms’ final values, calculated from the
final market clearing prices determined in the third and last trading period of each
treatment.
The median values of the firms are: 700 when all data points are used, 677.5 when
the indicative prices are excluded from the sample, and 667.5 when both indicative
prices and training periods are excluded. Wilcoxon signed-rank tests indicate that the
central tendency of each of the three empirical distributions does not differ from 667
and 628.07 (lowest p-value = 0.47).
We also observe that enough trading takes place at prices that are close to the mean
of the three market-clearing prices determined in each treatment. Let P¯ ∗T denote this
mean. On average, in each treatment, groups buy 23.5 units and sell 26.83 units at
prices falling in the interval [P¯ ∗T − 2, P¯ ∗T + 2]. Therefore, in spite of the complex-
ity of the experimental procedures and the difficulty of the task, subjects perform
surprisingly well and the results are reasonable.
Figure 1 shows that circles are more volatile than triangles, especially in the last
treatments. This is not surprising because the markets in the first two trading periods
are not yet mature (subjects get more adept as time passes), and because the indicative
prices are not binding. Consequently, the following analysis shall consider only the
20The empirical value of a firm is obtained by adding the elicited market value of equity and the market
value of bonds.
21See Appendix B for the calculation of this value.
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final market clearing prices and the six payoff-relevant treatments, unless otherwise
stated.
A valid concern here is that subjects may have an aversion to borrow experimen-
tal money. Accordingly, the lower their initial endowment of ECU, the less units of
shares they would buy. This, of course, would make the market values of the firms
dependent on the people’s money endowment. In order to test for this possibility, we
perform the following analysis. For each independent group, we calculate the average
value of the firms when BT ≤ 200 (denoted by V¯B≤200), and the average value of the
firms when BT ≥ 300 (denoted by V¯B≥300). A two-sided Wilcoxon signed rank test
comparing the nine V¯B≤200-means with the nine V¯B≥300-means does not reject the
null hypothesis of equality of the two series (p = 0.26). We can therefore conclude
that subjects’ money endowment does not significantly affect the firms’ value.
We conclude this subsection by noticing that not only Proposition 1 is the result
of individual maximization, it also imposes a strong condition on individual portfo-
lios. In particular, the proposition implies that individuals’ holdings of equity should
be the same under the different capital structures. An ANOVA analysis of individ-
ual shareholdings across the different capital structures cannot reject this hypothesis
(p > 0.10).
4.1.1 The effect of leverage on the cost of capital
We now turn to our main research question and examine the empirical relationship
between cost of capital and value of the firm derived from our data. As outlined
in Sect. 2, there are two main competing views on this relationship. The first, the
MM theorem, holds that the value of the firm is independent of its capital structure.
The second is that the relationship is U-shaped: the weighted average cost of capital
first decreases with the value of bonds and then increases. In the following, we shall
compare these two views and see which best organizes the data.
Figure 2 reports the average values of the firms as a function of the values of
the bonds, with average over the 9 independent groups. Since group heterogeneities
may blur the picture, the same relationship is presented in Fig. 3 for the 9 groups
Fig. 2 Average values of the firms conditional on the market value of the bonds
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Fig. 3 Values of the firms conditional on the market value of the bonds, separately for each of the 9
independent groups
separately. To give a more general account of the data, both indicative values (circles)
and final values (triangles) are illustrated. The continuous line in each panel of Fig. 3
denotes the group mean value of the firms, computed using only final market clearing
prices.
The MM theorem suggests that any increase in leverage leads to an increase in
the systematic risk of equity, which in turn leads the shareholders to demand higher
returns. How well could subjects recognize changes in systematic risk due to changes
in the capital structure? To address this issue, we compute the correlation between the
value of equity and the value of bonds. Consistent with the MM theorem, we find that
this correlation is negative and close to unity (Spearman’s ρ = −0.93, p < 0.01).
To examine the relationship between the value of the firm and the value of the
bonds more precisely, we run two linear mixed-effects regressions. The first regres-
sion models the market values of the firms as a linear function of the value of the
bonds (BT ), the square of the value of the bonds (B2T ), and period (t). Formally:
Vi = υ + ui + β1 · BT + β2 · B2T + β3 · t + εi, (8)
where i ∈ {1,2, . . . ,9} denotes the 9 independent groups, ui  N(0, σ 2u ) denotes the
random effects in the intercept for each group, and εi  N(0, σ 2e ).
The results (presented in Table 1) reveal that the coefficients of both BT and B2T
are statistically significant. Moreover, their signs are indicative of a U-shaped cost of
capital curve. The coefficient of t is weakly significant, suggesting that some kind of
learning is taking place.
In the second regression, the dependent variable is the weighted average cost of
capital (WACC), calculated as the expected return of the firm (i.e., 1000) divided
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Table 1 Regression results on
the market values of the firms
aSignificant at the 1 % level
bSignificant at the 10 % level
Expl. variable Coefficient Std. error t-statistic p-value
υ 677.4643a 30.6054 22.1354 0.0000
BT 0.6457a 0.1902 3.3956 0.0015
B2
T
−0.0011a 0.0003 −3.2616 0.0022
t −4.2244b 2.1541 −1.9611 0.0565
Std. dev. of the random effects σu = 38.8864
Std. dev. of error term σe = 58.0902
Number of observations 54
Table 2 Regression results on
the weighted average cost of
capital
aSignificant at the 1 % level
Expl. variable Coefficient Std. error t-statistic p-value
κ 1.5305a 0.0674 22.7151 0.0000
τ −0.9702a 0.2453 −3.9546 0.0003
τ2 1.0941a 0.2642 4.1418 0.0002
t 0.0069 0.0047 1.4620 0.1512
Std. dev. of the random effects σu = 0.0886
Std. dev. of error term σe = 0.1262
Number of observations 54
by the market value of the firm. Independent variables are the leverage ratio (τ ),
measured as the market value of the bonds divided by the market value of the firm,
the leverage ratio squared (τ 2), and period (t). The formal equation is similar to (8),
and the estimated equation turns out as follows (see Table 2):
WACC = 1.5305 − 0.9702 · τ + 1.0941 · τ 2,
which offers further support for the U-shaped cost of capital approach.
4.2 Individual decision-making experiment
In this section, we present the results of the control experiment where valuations are
defined as reservation prices that a person is either willing to pay (WTP) to purchase x
units or willing to accept (WTA) to forgo x units. Table 3 provides average valuations,
separately for the type of trade, the eight bonds’ values, and the four traded quantities.
One thing which stands out immediately is that WTP is generally lower than
WTA. The difference is significant not only when we average over all four traded
quantities (p < 0.01, paired Wilcoxon test), but also when we consider the four fea-
sible quantities separately (p < 0.05 for all four one-sided paired Wilcoxon tests).
Additionally, the difference between WTP and WTA is larger, the more units need
to be traded (on average: −131.46 for x = 1; −199.78 for x = 5; −260.91 for
x = 9; −299.08 for x = 12,13). In the last four decades, numerous studies have pro-
vided evidence of a WTP-WTA gap (for reviews, see Horowitz and McConnell 2002;
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Table 3 Mean valuations for each value of bonds and each traded quantity, separately for buy and sell
decisions
Bonds
value
Buy decisions (WTP) Sell decisions (WTA)
1 unit 5 units 9 units 12, 13 units 1 unit 5 units 9 units 12, 13 units
0 775.19 657.53 640.41 640.22 848.81 842.91 861.06 815.19
50 765.03 609.16 560.62 575.81 883.16 825.91 852.41 916.72
100 687.22 648.06 606.34 624.28 825.31 867.44 814.25 825.72
200 734.81 609.25 580.62 499.59 814.06 840.69 847.25 878.41
300 684.09 618.75 539.22 541.12 915.31 839.56 885.16 905.78
350 727.03 639.41 654.12 595.69 875.69 848.84 855.97 867.94
400 661.88 687.69 621.69 543.94 831.25 824.00 851.12 879.81
500 726.94 657.75 555.47 515.88 820.25 836.50 878.53 839.59
All 720.27 640.95 594.81 567.07 851.73 840.73 855.72 866.14
Sayman and Öncüler 2005). The studies draw on a wide range of goods including or-
dinary private goods (such as chocolates, pens, and mugs), non-market goods (such
as food safety), and lotteries.22 To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to doc-
ument the WTP-WTA gap with intangible assets in a lab experiment.
Participants’ endowment of experimental money varies from round to round, and
the ECU at their disposal may affect willingness to pay. It is therefore worthy to
investigate whether buy decisions vary with the ECU endowment. To this aim, we
perform an analysis similar to the one done for the market experiment. We compute,
for each x and each subject, the average WTP(x) separately for BT ≤ 200 and BT ≥
300. Comparing the 32 individual average WTP(x) when BT ≤ 200 and when BT ≥
300, it is not possible to reject the null hypothesis that, for each x, the two series have
identical distributions (p > 0.10 for all four traded quantities, two-sided Wilcoxon
signed rank tests). This suggests that subjects’ willingness to pay is not influenced by
the size of the ECU endowment.
The utility maximization assumption in Proposition 1 (Eq. 6) implies that if all
shares were owned by individuals identical to a certain subject, the value of the firm
resulting from the price reported for a given quantity should be the same across all
capital structures. That is, if we denote by Vfτ ′ (x) and Vfτ∗ (x) the value of the firms
with capital structure, respectively, τ ′ and τ ∗ when x shares are traded, the propo-
sition requires that for each x: Vfτ ′ (x) = Vfτ ∗(x) for all τ ′, τ ∗ = 1,2, . . . ,8, and
τ ′ = τ ∗.
To test this assumption, for each x we compare—via a series of Wilcoxon signed-
rank tests—the observed valuations of the 32 subjects across the eight capital struc-
tures. For each x we therefore perform 28 comparisons (namely, 8!2!(8−2)! ).23 With
22See Plott and Zeiler (2005) and Isoni et al. (2011) for a brief account of these experiments and their
results.
23An alternative way to test the assumption would be to examine, for each individual, how similar his 8
valuations are across the 4 traded quantities. We preferred our approach because of its greater statistical
power: we compare two series, each of which consists of 32—rather than 8—data points.
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four traded quantities, we have 28 × 4 = 112 comparisons for the buy decisions and
112 comparisons for the sell decisions. Using p < 0.05 as the significance level, a
significant difference is detected for 5.35 % (6 out of 112) comparisons in the buy
decisions, and for 2.68 % (3 out of 112) comparisons in the sell decisions.24 Thus,
overall, we do not find strong evidence against the utility maximization assumption
implied by Proposition 1.
Finally, we run a linear regression with mixed effects to explore carefully the im-
pact of bonds on the valuation of the firms. Explanatory variables are the intercept
(υ), the bonds’ value (BT ), the square of the bonds’ value (B2T ), the dummy Trades
(which equals 0 for the WTP and 1 for the WTA), the four traded quantities (x1, x5,
x9, and x123), and the interaction between traded quantity and type of trade. Random
effects are the 32 individual subjects. Formally, the model is as follows:
Vi = υ + ui + β1 · BT + β2 · B2T + β3 · Trades + β4 · x5 + β5 · x9
+ β6 · x123 + β7 · Trades · x5 + β8 · Trades · x9
+ β9 · Trades · x9 + β10 · Trades · x123 + εi,
where i ∈ {1,2, . . . ,32} denotes the 32 subjects, ui  N(0, σ 2u ) denotes the random
effects in the intercept for each subject, and εi  N(0, σ 2e ). The results of the regres-
sion are presented in Table 4.
The coefficients of both BT and B2T are not significant (i.e., bonds have no effect
on the valuation of firms), which agrees with the MM theorem rather than with the
U-shaped cost of capital approach. This result is not consistent with the one obtained
from the market experiment. We have no clear-cut answer to the reason for this dis-
crepancy. However, we suspect that it may be related to the large difference in the
Table 4 Regression results on
reservation prices
aSignificant at the 1 % level
Expl. variable Coefficient Std. error t-statistic p-value
υ 729.7523a 25.6347 28.4674 0.0000
BT −0.0681 0.1166 −0.5840 0.5593
B2
T
0.0001 0.0002 0.3405 0.7335
Trades 131.4570a 21.2012 6.2004 0.0000
x5 −79.3242a 21.2012 −3.7415 0.0002
x9 −125.4609a 21.2012 −5.9176 0.0000
x123 −153.2070a 21.2012 −7.2263 0.0000
Trades × x5 68.3242a 29.9830 2.2788 0.0228
Trades × x9 129.4492a 29.9830 4.3174 0.0000
Trades × x123 167.6211a 29.9830 5.5905 0.0000
Std. dev. of the random effects σu = 102.2934
Std. dev. of error term σe = 239.8642
Number of observations 2048
24All significant differences are observed when the subjects trade the maximum quantity of shares (x = 12
or 13).
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standard deviation of the error terms in the two conditions: 239.8642 for the individ-
ual decision-making experiment vs. 58.0902 for the market experiment. The larger
standard deviation of the error terms in the individual decision-making experiment
suggests that participants’ decisions are noisier in this environment. The remaining
estimated coefficients confirm the results discussed above: (a) WTA exceed WTP
(the coefficient of Trades is positive and significant), and (b) the more units need to
be traded, the lower the WTP and the higher the WTA.
With each subject’s demand and supply points in hand, we could create artificial
markets and compute the value of the firms from the market clearing price of these
artificial markets. Yet, due to the huge difference between WTP and WTA, no market
clearing price exists in most artificial markets. Note the marked contrast between this
result and the one of the market experiment. When valuations result from a market in-
stitution, many trades take place around the reservation price of 667. The finding that
the market more closely matches rational choice theory is in line with past literature
indicating that exchange institutions “serve to push behavior more toward the Homo
Economicus fiction we assume in our models” (Shogren and Taylor 2008, p. 34).25
5 Conclusions
When the leverage of a firm increases, the systematic risk of the firm’s equity in-
creases as well. Modigliani and Miller (1958) show that the higher return demanded
by equity holders exactly offsets the lower market value of the bonds and, as a re-
sult, the weighted average cost of capital remains the same. This paper is a first
attempt to investigate the Modigliani-Miller theorem in laboratory markets where
agents can trade shares of firms generating the same income stream via different cap-
ital structures. The design includes some features intended to give the theorem its
“best shot” at organizing the data. Additionally, we performed a control individual
decision-making experiment where we elicited several points on the individual sup-
ply and demand curves for shares.
The results identify some strengths and some weaknesses of Modigliani and
Miller’s approach. On the one hand, subjects recognize the increased systematic risk
of equity when leverage increases, and thus demand a higher return for bearing this
risk. On the other hand, the regression results are supportive of a U-shaped cost of
capital curve, suggesting that subjects tend to underestimate the riskiness of low-
leveraged equity and to overestimate the riskiness of high-leveraged equity.
We do not regard our results as a behavioral rejection of the main proposition of the
MM theorem. First, its main proposition does a good job of organizing the data in the
control experiment. Second, some of its hypotheses cannot be rejected in the market
experiment as well. The lack of full support for the theorem may be due to market
“imperfections”, defined as anything that interferes with trade, therefore causing a
rational market participant either to deviate from holding the market portfolio or to
25Chu and Chu (1990) show that the incidence of preference reversals is reduced in a market-like en-
vironment. Brocas and Carrillo (2001) find that direct competition alleviates inefficiencies due to time
inconsistency.
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depart from his preferred risk level (see, e.g., DeGennaro 2005). For instance, the
use of a single call market and the exclusion of arbitrage opportunities could have
affected our findings. Understanding whether these design choices are important or
the violation of the theorem is genuine in nature may provide a fruitful avenue for
future research.
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Appendix A: Algorithm to compute the market clearing price in the call
auction
The following algorithm was used to calculate the market clearing price:
1. Any order for buying Q units at price Pb is transformed into a vector where Pb is
repeated Q times, so that each element of this vector can then be treated as a single
buy order at price Pb . The individual vectors are then combined into a general
buy vector, which is sorted by buying price in descending order (from highest to
lowest). A similar operation is done for all sell orders except that the resulting
vector is sorted by selling price from lowest to highest. In this way, aggregate
demand and supply schedules are constructed:
The buy vector (P 1b ,P
2
b , . . . ,P
i
b,P
i+1
b , . . . ,P
end
b ),
The sell vector (P 1s ,P 1s , . . . ,P is ,P i+1s , . . . ,P ends ),
where P ib ≥ P i+1b and P is ≤ P i+1s .
2. These two vectors are then pairwise compared (P ib and P is ), and this searching
process continues until a first pair i where P ib < P
i
s is found. Obviously, a market
clearing price should satisfy
P ib < P < P
i
s ,
since these two orders should not be executed. Meanwhile, P i−1b and P i−1s should
be exchangeable at the market clearing price, which implies
P i−1s < P < P i−1b .
Combining these two conditions, the market clearing price should satisfy
max
{
P i−1s ,P ib
}
< P ∗ < min
{
P i−1b ,P
i
s
}
.
In the experiment, P ∗ is set to be max{P
i−1
s ,P
i
b }+min{P i−1b ,P is }
2 .
3. If there is an excess demand or supply at this market clearing price, only the min-
imum quantity of the buy or sell orders is randomly selected for execution.
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4. It is possible that a market clearing price may not be found by this way if P 1b < P 1s
or P endb > P
end
s . In this case, P 1s − 0.01 is chosen to be the market clearing price
if P 1b < P
1
s , and P endb + 0.01 is chosen to be the market clearing price if P endb >
P ends .
Appendix B: Calculation of equilibrium value of firms when agents have
CRRA utility function u(w) = w1−1.471−1.47
Although Proposition 1 concerns the comparison of firms’ values in different
economies and does not rely on a specific utility function, the market participants’
risk attitudes can affect the value of a firm in each single economy. Here we pro-
vide an example to illustrate how the equilibrium value of a firm is determined when
individuals have CRRA utility function u(w) = w1−1.471−1.47 .
Consider first the economy where the firm issues no bond (B = 0). There are 100
units of equity outstanding. Let s denote the price per unit of equity, and α¯ be the
initial endowment of an individual in the economy. Individuals with CRRA utility
function in this economy maximize their utility by choosing the number of shares to
hold (α) and the individual credit to borrow from the market at the interest rate of
1.5 (b).26
max
α,b
U(α, b) = 0.5 · (12 · α + 1.5 · b)
1−1.47
1 − 1.47 + 0.5 ·
(8 · α + 1.5 · b)1−1.47
1 − 1.47
s.t. α · s + b = α¯ · s.
Solving for b from the budget constraint and replacing b = (α¯ − α) · s in the
maximization equation, we have
max
α
U(α) = 0.5 · [12 · α + 1.5 · (α¯ − α) · s]
1−1.47
1 − 1.47
+ 0.5 · (8 · α + 1.5 · (α¯ − α) · s)
1−1.47
1 − 1.47 .
The first order condition for the above maximization problem is
dU(α)
dα
= 0.5 · (12 − 1.5 · s) · [12 · α + 1.5 · (α¯ − α) · s]−1.47
+ 0.5 · (8 − 1.5 · s) · [8 · α + 1.5 · (α¯ − α) · s]−1.47
= 0,
which reduces to
(
1.5 · s − 8
12 − 1.5 · s
)− 11.47 =
[
8 · α + 1.5(α¯ − α)s
12 · α + 1.5(α¯ − α)s
]
.
26We drop the index for each individual since they are assumed to be the same.
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Setting K = ( 1.5·s−812−1.5·s )−
1
1.47 , we have
α = 1.5 · α¯ · s − 1.5 · K · α¯ · s
12 · K − 1.5 · K · s − 8 + 1.5 · s .
Thus, individual demand for equity is a function of its price s. Being the economy
closed, the market for equity should clear. Since all individuals have the same utility
function, there will be no trade in equilibrium and every agent holds the initial amount
of equity. In this equilibrium, the market clears when
s = 6.2807.
Here, we have assumed that the firm issues no bond. The equilibrium value of the
firm is therefore V = 100 × s = 628.07. Proposition 1 suggests that the same value
should be obtained from economies with a different capital structure.
References
Arzac, E. R., & Glosten, L. R. (2005). A reconsideration of tax shield valuation. European Financial
Management, 11, 453–461.
Becker, G. M., DeGroot, M. H., & Marschak, J. (1964). Measuring utility by a single-response sequential
method. Systems Research and Behavioral Science, 9, 226–232.
Cason, T. N., & Friedman, D. (1997). Price formation in single call markets. Econometrica, 65(2), 311–
345.
Cason, T. N., & Friedman, D. (2008). A comparison of market institutions. In C. R. Plott & V. L. Smith
(Eds.), Handbook of experimental economics results (pp. 264–272). Amsterdam: North Holland.
Chu, Y.-P., & Chu, R.-L. (1990). The subsidence of preference reversals in simplified and marketlike
experimental settings: a note. American Economic Review, 80(4), 902–911.
Dann, L. Y. (1981). Common stock repurchases: an analysis of returns to bondholders and stockholders.
Journal of Financial Economics, 9(2), 113–138.
Davenport, M. (1971). Leverage and the cost of capital: some tests using British data. Economica, 38(150),
136–162.
DeGennaro, R. P. (2005). Market imperfections. Working paper series 2005-12, Federal Reserve Bank of
Atlanta.
Dell’Ariccia, G., & Marquez, R. (2010). Risk and the corporate structure of banks. The Journal of Finance,
65(3), 1075–1096.
Economides, N., & Schwartz, R. A. (1995). Electronic call market trading. The Journal of Portfolio Man-
agement, 21, 10–18.
Fischbacher, U. (2007). Zurich toolbox for readymade economic experiments. Experimental Economics,
10(2), 171–178.
Graham, J. R., & Harvey, C. R. (2001). The theory and practice of corporate finance: evidence from the
field. Journal of Financial Economics, 60, 187–243.
Harrison, G., & Rutström, E. (2008). Risk aversion in the laboratory. In J. Cox & G. Harrison (Eds.), Risk
aversion in experiments: Vol. 12. Research in experimental economics (pp. 41–196). Burlington:
Emerald Group Publishing.
Horowitz, J. H., & McConnell, K. E. (2002). A review of WTA/WTP studies. Journal of Environmental
Economics and Management, 44, 426–447.
Hirshleifer, J. (1966). Investment decision under uncertainty: application of the state preference approach.
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 80(2), 252–277.
Holt, C. A., & Laury, S. K. (2002). Risk aversion and incentive effects in lottery choices. American Eco-
nomic Review, 92, 1644–1655.
Isoni, A., Loomes, G., & Sugden, R. (2011). The willingness to pay—willingness to accept gap, the “en-
dowment effect”, subject misconceptions, and experimental procedures for eliciting valuations: com-
ment. American Economic Review, 101(2), 991–1011.
716 M.V. Levati et al.
Kagel, J. H. (2004). Double auction markets with stochastic supply and demand schedules: call markets
and continuous auction trading mechanisms. In S. Huck (Ed.), Advances in understanding strategic
behaviour: game theory, experiments, and bounded rationality. Essays in honour of Werner Güth
(pp. 181–208). Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
Levy, H., & Levy, M. (2002). Experimental test of the prospect theory value function: a stochastic domi-
nance approach. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 89, 1058–1081.
Masulis, R. W. (1980). The effects of capital structure change on security prices: a study of exchange
offers. Journal of Financial Economics, 8(2), 139–178.
Masulis, R. W., & Korwar, A. N. (1986). Seasoned equity offerings: an empirical investigation. Journal of
Financial Economics, 15(1/2), 91–118.
Miller, M. H., & Modigliani, F. (1966). Some estimates of the cost of the capital to the electric utility
industry, 1954–1957. American Economic Review, 56, 333–391.
Modigliani, F., & Miller, M. H. (1958). The cost of capital, corporation finance and the theory of invest-
ment. American Economic Review, 48(3), 261–297.
Myers, S. C. (2001). Capital structure. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 15(2), 81–102.
Pinegar, J. M., & Lease, R. C. (1986). The impact of preferred-for-common exchange offers on firm value.
The Journal of Finance, 41(4), 795–814.
Plott, C. R., & Zeiler, K. (2005). The willingness to pay-willingness to accept gap, the “endowment effect”,
subject misconceptions, and experimental procedures for eliciting valuations. American Economic
Review, 95(3), 530–545.
Quiggin, J. (1982). A theory of anticipated utility. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 3, 323–
343.
Robichek, A. A., McDonald, J. G., & Higgins, R. C. (1967). Some estimates of the cost of capital to
electric utility industry, 1954–1957: comment. American Economic Review, 57, 1278–1288.
Sayman, S., & Öncüler, A. (2005). Effects of study design characteristics on the WTA–WTP disparity:
a meta analytical framework. Journal of Economic Psychology, 26, 289–312.
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997). The limits of arbitrage. The Journal of Finance, 52, 35–55.
Shogren, J. F., & Taylor, L. O. (2008). On behavioral-environmental economics. Review of Environmental
Economics and Policy, 2, 26–44.
Smith, V. L., Williams, A. W., Bratton, W. K., & Vannoni, M. G. (1982). Competitive market institutions:
double auctions vs. sealed bid-offer auctions. American Economic Review, 72(1), 58–77.
Stiglitz, J. E. (1969). A re-examination of the Modigliani-Miller theorem. American Economic Review,
59(5), 784–793.
Viscusi, W. K. (1989). Prospective reference theory: toward an explanation of the paradoxes. Journal of
Risk and Uncertainty, 2(3), 235–264.
Weston, J. F. (1963). A test of capital propositions. Southern Economic Journal, 30, 105–112.
